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LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The past year generally has been another quiet one for chil-
dren's legal issues in Virginia, although it was a busier than
normal year in the United States Supreme Court with the grand-
parents' visitation case,' the Texas high school football game
prayer case,2 a significant Title I case involving the provision of
instructional material to religiously operated schools,3 and the
gay Boy Scout leader case.' Not as much occurred at the state
level, with little legislation of great significance to children and
youth being enacted at the 2000 General Assembly session. How-
ever, a succession of cases interpreting and applying Baker v.
Commonwealth'-regarding juvenile and domestic relations dis-
trict court jurisdiction over juveniles in the absence of notice to
biological parents--caused a bit of excitement for juvenile law
practitioners and much concern for prosecutors.6
II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND NON-CRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR
As noted above, the most significant recent decision in the de-
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., 1959, LL.B., 1961,
Washington and Lee University.
1. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
2. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
3. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
4. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
5. 28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (Ct. App. 1998), affd sub nom. Commonwealth v.
Baker, 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999) (per curiam).
6. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Legal Issues Involving
Children, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1001, 1007-08 (1999).
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linquency area was Commonwealth v. Baker,7 in which the Su-
preme Court of Virginia affirmed the Virginia Court of Appeals'
decision that the failure of the juvenile court to serve notice on
the juvenile's biological father prior to a transfer hearing de-
prived the Stafford County Circuit Court of jurisdiction to try
Baker as an adult.' The supreme court affirmed in a per curiam
decision, and subsequently declined to grant the Attorney Gen-
eral's request that the ruling be given only prospective effect.9
The court of appeals had noted that the then applicable version of
Virginia Code section 16.1-263 required service on the "parents,""
and thus, the absence of service, or even an attempt of service, on
the biological father deprived the juvenile and circuit courts of ju-
risdiction over Baker." Although the General Assembly limited
the long-term impact of this decision on future cases by amending
the law to require notice to "at least one parent" as of July 1,
1999,2 one early effect of Baker was the staying of executions in
two cases involving juveniles on death row for capital murder
convictions. 3
In the first of those cases, Thomas v. Garraghty,4 Thomas, who
was seventeen years old at the time of the offenses, was convicted
of capital murder, first degree murder, and two firearms charges
in 1991 and was sentenced to death and various terms of impris-
onment. He had been informally entrusted by his mother to his
maternal grandparents in 1982, and legally adopted by them pur-
suant to consent by both his biological parents, albeit conditional
consent by each was not contemplated by the adoption laws. 6 His
7. 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999).
8. Id. at 2, 516 S.E.2d at 220.
9. Id.
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-263 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
11. Baker, 28 Va. App. at 315, 504 S.E.2d at 399. There was not even a certification
that the identity of the father or his whereabouts were unknown. Id. at 312, 504 S.E.2d at
397.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-263 (Repl. Vol. 1999). However, since this section of the Vir-
ginia Code provides for notice in all matters before the juvenile and domestic relations dis-
trict court, the amendment presents constitutional problems, at least in abuse and neglect,
foster care review, permanency planning, termination of residual parental rights, custody
and visitation proceedings, and perhaps other matters as well. See Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
13. See Thomas v. Garraghty, 258 Va. 530, 522 S.E.2d 865 (1999); Roach v. Dir., Dep't
of Corrs., 258 Va. 537, 522 S.E.2d 869 (1999).
14. 258 Va. 530, 522 S.E.2d 865 (1999).
15. Id. at 532, 522 S.E.2d at 866.
16. Id. at 533, 522 S.E.2d at 867.
LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
adoptive grandparents then both died, and he went to live with
his mother for a while."7 Then, Thomas returned to the rural
county where he had been living with his grandparents to live
with his aunt and uncle, with whom he lived at the time of the
killings.'" There was no legal custodian or guardian designated by
any court. 9 Since there were no "parents" within the meaning of
the Virginia Code, notice of the charges and transfer hearing was
given to the aunt and uncle as persons "standing in loco paren-
tis."2 ° This satisfied the notice requirements of the Virginia Code
and thus the writ of habeas corpus was denied.2
In the second case, Roach v. Department of Corrections,2 the
youth was convicted of capital murder in the commission of rob-
bery while armed with a firearm and sentenced to death. Since-
he was seventeen at the time of the offenses, the case was heard
in the juvenile and domestic relations district court, and he was
transferred to Greene County Circuit Court for trial as an adult.'
He later sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that his par-
ents were not given notice of that proceeding in violation of Vir-
ginia Code section 16.1-263 and Baker." The parents had been
served with notice of the initial juvenile court hearing and were
both present at that hearing. 6 The case was continued to a sub-
sequent date, and Roach's mother was served with a witness sub-
poena for that date at the request of the defense.2
At the hearing the witnesses were sequestered, also at the re-
quest of the defense. A confession was offered, but the juvenile
judge took the admissibility of the statement under advisement
and later ruled that there was probable cause to support the
transfer.29 The circuit court thereafter remanded the case to the
17. Id. at 534, 522 S.E.2d at 867.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 535, 522 S.E.2d at 868.
21. Id. at 536, 522 S.E.2d at 868.
22. 258 Va. 537, 522 S.E.2d 869 (1999).
23. Id. at 540, 522 S.E.2d at 869.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 540, 522 S.E.2d at 870.
26. Id. at 541, 522 S.E.2d at 870.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 542, 522 S.E.2d at 870.
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juvenile court on a defense appeal because the statement was not
admitted into evidence, and thus, there was no probable cause."°
The case went back to the juvenile court without any formal
notice to the parents although they were present.3' The statement
was then admitted, probable cause found, and the case trans-
ferred again.32 There was, in the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Virginia, adequate notice to both parents of the initial transfer
hearing and actual notice of subsequent proceedings.33 As noted
in last year's survey,34 the Virginia Court of Appeals had previ-
ously held in Weese v. Commonwealth35 that where a juvenile's
parents had notice of the juvenile court proceedings, there was no
need to give new notice of the de novo hearing on appeal in the
circuit court.36 Both Thomas and Roach were subsequently exe-
cuted in January of 2000.
31
In the wake of these decisions, it seems clear that the failure to
give statutory notice to the parents of a juvenile before the juve-
nile and domestic relations district court deprives that court of
jurisdiction over both the juvenile and the case and, in the event
of a transfer to the circuit court for trial as an adult, that court
would also have no jurisdiction. However, if the biological parents
were no longer legally "parents" because their parental rights had
been terminated in some fashion and the legal custodians re-
ceived notice, or if the parents were present pursuant to actual
notice despite receiving no legal notice, then the court has juris-
diction.3" In addition, a longstanding provision in Virginia Code
section 16.1-263 had allowed for a case to proceed without notice
to a parent if a certification was made on the record that the
identity of a parent was "not reasonably ascertainable" or a
30. Id.
31. Id. at 542, 522 S.E.2d at 871.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 544, 522 S.E.2d at 872.
34. Shepherd, supra note 6, at 1007-08.
35. 30 Va. App. 484, 517 S.E.2d 740 (1999).
36. Id. at 491-92, 517 S.E.2d at 744; see also Commonwealth v. Frye, 48 Va. Cir. 223
(Cir. Ct. 1999) (Loudoun County) (ruling that the physical presence of the parents pursu-
ant to actual notice obviated the necessity for statutory notice).
37. Thomas was executed on January 10, 2000, and Roach on January 19, 2000. Vic-
tor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Executions for Ju-
venile Crimes, January 1, 1973-June 30, 2000, at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/
juvdeath.htm.
38. See Roach, 258 Va. at 545, 522 S.E.2d at 872.
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known parent's whereabouts was unknown. 39
In another capital case, Johnson v. Commonwealth, ° the Su-
preme Court of Virginia concluded that the lack of notice to the
juvenile's parent was irrelevant because the youth had previously
been transferred to circuit court and tried as an adult, and thus,
no transfer hearing was necessary on the instant offense pursu-
ant to Virginia Code section 16.1-271."'
Since the decisions in Thomas and Roach, three additional Su-
preme Court of Virginia cases further clarified the meaning of
Baker.42 In David Moore v. Commonwealth,' petitions were filed
against the defendant in the juvenile court in December 1994,
charging him with two counts of murder, as well as the use of
firearms in the commission of the murders." A transfer hearing
was held in June 1995 without notice to his biological father and
without the presence of either the father or the mother.45 Since
the proceedings took place prior to the 1996 amendments to Vir-
ginia Code section 16.1-269.1, the indictment of Moore following
transfer by the juvenile court did not "cure" the jurisdictional de-
fect and the case was governed by Baker, even though Moore, un-
like Baker, did not object to the jurisdiction of the circuit court
prior to indictment.46 Justices Compton, Kinser, and Lacy dis-
sented.47
In Jackson v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison,' the Supreme
Court of Virginia granted Chauncey Jackson's Petition for Re-
hearing of the dismissal of his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus, based on the failure to give proper notice to petitioner's par-
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-263(E) (Repl. Vol. 1982).
40. 259 Va. 654, 529 S.E.2d 769 (2000).
41. Id. at 670, 529 S.E.2d at 778. Virginia Code section 16.1-271 provides that once a
youth has been tried or treated as an adult, the juvenile court is precluded from taking
jurisdiction for subsequent offenses. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-271 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
42. See David Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 431, 527 S.E.2d 406 (2000); Jackson
v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 259 Va. 566, 529 S.E.2d 587 (2000); Dennis Moore v.
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 405, 527 S.E.2d 415 (2000).
43. 259 Va. 431, 527 S.E.2d 406 (2000)
44. Id. at 434, 527 S.E.2d at 407.
45. Id. at 435, 527 S.E.2d at 407.
46. Id. at 440, 527 S.E.2d at 411.
47. Id. at 441, 527 S.E.2d at 411 (Compton, Kinser & Lacy, JJ., dissenting).
48. 259 Va. 566, 529 S.E.2d 587 (2000).
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ents in light of the David Moore holding. 9
In Dennis Moore v. Commonwealth,"° however, the juvenile
court failed to give notice to Moore's biological father prior to a
preliminary hearing on certification to the Henrico County Cir-
cuit Court held pursuant to petitions filed on October 15, 1996,
charging offenses committed on July 26, 1996."' Since the pro-
ceedings were governed by Virginia Code section 16.1-269.1(E) as
it existed pursuant to amendments effective on July 1, 1996, the
failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court prior to indictment
in the circuit court amounted to a waiver of any jurisdictional de-
fects.52
The Dennis Moore holding had been anticipated in Carter v.
Commonwealth,53 wherein the Virginia Court of Appeals con-
cluded that even though the juvenile court may not have complied
with the requirement of notice to Carter's parents pursuant to
Virginia Code sections 16.1-263 and 16.1-264, he "waived his
right to challenge that failure by not raising it before his indict-
ment in the circuit court."54 Since the offense occurred after July
1, 1996, Virginia Code section 16.1-269.1(E) provided that errors
or defects in the juvenile court proceeding in a transfer or certifi-
cation proceeding are cured by indictment in the circuit court. A
series of unpublished Virginia Court of Appeals decisions followed
the holdings in Dennis Moore and Carter that failures to give pa-
rental notice after July 1, 1996, were cured by failure to object
prior to indictment.56 That position was further reinforced by the
49. Id. at 566, 527 S.E.2d at 587.
50. 259 Va. 405, 527 S.E.2d 415 (2000).
51. Id. at 408, 527 S.E.2d at 416.
52. Id. at 410, 527 S.E.2d at 418.
53. 31 Va. App. 393, 523 S.E.2d 544 (Ct. App. 2000).
54. Id. at 395, 523 S.E.2d at 545.
55. Id. at 394, 523 S.E.2d at 545.
56. See Adams v. Commonwealth, No. 0641-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 382 (Ct. App.
May 16, 2000) (unpublished decision); McDonald v. Commonwealth, No. 0679-99-2, 2000
Va. App. LEXIS 304 (Ct. App. May 16, 2000) (unpublished decision); Finney v. Common-
wealth, No. 2038-99-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 316 (Ct. App. May 2, 2000) (unpublished de-
cision); Nelson v. Commonwealth, No. 0283-99-1, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 245 (Ct. App. Apr.
4, 2000) (unpublished decision); Souksengmany v. Commonwealth, No. 1641-99-4, 2000
Va. App. LEXIS 256 (Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2000) (unpublished decision); Gilbert v. Common-
wealth, No. 1515-99-1, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 231 (Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2000) (unpublished
decision); Ballard v. Commonwealth, No. 0075-99-1, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 201 (Ct. App.
Mar. 21, 2000) (unpublished decision).
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decision in Shackleford v. Commonwealth." One reported circuit
court opinion concluded that the convictions of a juvenile in Feb-
ruary 1996 must be set aside pursuant to motion by the defen-
dant because the juvenile and circuit courts never acquired juris-
diction over the youth because no notice was given to the
defendant's father."
A new code provision enacted by the 2000 General Assembly
provides that a claim of error must be raised within one year from
the date of final judgment in the circuit court or one year from the
effective date of the statute, whichever is later.59 Otherwise, it
will not constitute a ground for relief in any judicial proceeding,
thus establishing a statute of limitations on Baker claims and
other errors.6"
Thus, the current state of Baker-type litigation is that matters
arising from charges occurring after July 1, 1996, are subject to
default if the issue of notice was not raised prior to indictment in
the circuit court, and cases based on defects existing prior to July
1, 1996, or on or after July 1, 2000, must be filed within one year
from the date of final judgment or one year from the effective date
of the statute on July 1, 2000, whichever is later. Thus, there is a
narrow window of opportunity for Baker claims. Lawyers with
such claims also have to deal with such procedural issues as how
to raise the claim. Because of the statutory limitations on habeas
corpus claims and who has the burden of proof in such proceed-
ings, a motion to vacate the judgment for lack of jurisdiction
would seem to be the better approach. It would appear that once
the defendant has established from the juvenile court record that
no notice was given to a parent as required by the statute, the
burden shifts to the Commonwealth.6 '
The Virginia Court of Appeals dealt with some other jurisdic-
tional cases that arose in a different context from Baker. In Wood-
fork v. Commonwealth,62 a juvenile was transferred to New Kent
County Circuit Court and convicted of malicious wounding and
57. 32 Va. App. 307, 528 S.E.2d 123 (Ct. App. 2000).
58. Commonwealth v. Nixon, 50 Va. Cir. 454 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Portsmouth City).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
60. See id.
61. There may be a practical problem presented by issues of paternity or the like.
62. 31 Va. App. 154, 521 S.E.2d 781 (Ct. App. 1999).
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attempted grand larceny." At the initial transfer hearing on Oc-
tober 1, 1997, the juvenile was charged with malicious wounding
and abduction, but the juvenile court found that the evidence was
insufficient to establish probable cause and no finding was made
concerning the youth's age.64 On the same date, the same victim
filed new petitions charging Woodfork with aggravated malicious
wounding and attempted grand larceny.65 A second transfer
hearing was held and the juvenile court found both probable
cause and that the juvenile was sixteen at the time of the of-
fense.66 When the case arrived in the circuit court, the defense at-
torney replied to a court inquiry that he had no objection to the
transfer procedures.6 ' At a subsequent hearing, the defense at-
torney repeated his belief that there was no error.6' However,
counsel subsequently asserted that the court never acquired ju-
risdiction because of the juvenile court's failure to find that he
was of an age to be transferred at the initial transfer hearing.69
The Virginia Court of Appeals found no error in the circuit court's
rejection of this claim.7° The court concluded that the first trans-
fer proceeding was properly dismissed and the juvenile court need
not have retained jurisdiction and tried Woodfork as a juvenile
because there was no finding that he was not fourteen years of
age.7 ' The court further found that the second hearing was proper
with different charges, and the juvenile judge made all the proper
findings, and thus, that jurisdiction properly was vested in the
circuit court.72 The conviction was affirmed on the merits, but the
case was remanded for the sole purpose of amending the convic-
tion and sentencing orders to conform to the judge's findings.73
Likewise, in Nelson v. Commonwealth,74 the Virginia Court of
Appeals not only concluded that the failure to give notice to a
63. Id. at 156, 521 S.E.2d at 782.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 156-57, 521 S.E.2d at 782.
67. Id. at 157, 521 S.E.2d at 782.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 158, 521 S.E.2d at 783.
70. Id. at 155, 521 S.E.2d at 782.
71. Id. at 160, 521 S.E.2d at 784.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 161, 521 S.E.2d at 784.
74. No. 0283-99-1, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 245 (Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2000) (unpublished de-
cision).
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parent pursuant to Baker is cured by Virginia Code section 16.1-
269.1(E) 5 but that the inconsistency of the juvenile court's single
reference to a charge of malicious wounding where the petition
alleged aggravated malicious wounding was rendered moot by
Virginia Code section 16.1-269.1(D), which permits the common-
wealth to proceed by direct indictment.16 Also, in Scott v. Com-
monwealth," the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that any error
in the failure of the juvenile court to make any finding with re-
spect to Scott's mental retardation during the certification hear-
ing pursuant to Virginia Code section 16.1-269.1 was waived by
the failure to assert the alleged defect prior to indictment in
Newport News Circuit Court, again relying on section 16.1-
269.1(E). 8
In Crawford v. Commonwealth,9 the adult defendant was
charged with conspiracy to distribute drugs and the indictment
charged that the conspiracy began while Crawford was still a ju-
venile.8" The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing
the circuit court could not have jurisdiction unless the case began
in the juvenile and domestic relations district court.8' The trial
judge denied the motion and amended the indictment to allege
that the conspiracy began after Crawford turned eighteen and re-
arraigned him.8 2 This was proper and "did not substantively alter
the charge against [Crawford]. s
The Fauquier County Circuit Court decided an unusual issue
in Commonwealth v. K ' In October 1998, a juvenile was arrested
on a petition charging him with aggravated malicious wounding,
and the Commonwealth gave notice of its intention to transfer the
case to the circuit court pursuant to Virginia Code section 16.1-
269.1(B).85 A preliminary hearing was held in the juvenile court
in January 1999, and at its close the prosecution conceded that
75. Id. at *6.
76. Id. at *3-4.
77. 31 Va. App. 461, 524 S.E.2d 162 (Ct. App. 2000).
78. Id. at 465-66, 524 S.E.2d at 164.
79. No. 1844-99-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 367 (Ct. App. May 16, 2000) (unpublished
decision).
80. Id. at *1-2.
81. Id. at *2.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *4.
84. 48 Va. Cir. 333 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Fauquier County).
85. Id.
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the evidence was insufficient to prove the charge and announced
that it would proceed only on malicious wounding under Virginia
Code section 16.1-269.1(C), also pursuant to a preliminary hear-
ing. 6 The judge took the case under advisement and ruled two
days later that he could not find probable cause of the felony, but
did find probable cause of the misdemeanor offense of assault and
battery. 7 The juvenile court retained jurisdiction and ordered
that a trial date be set.8" Several days later the parties returned
to court, and the youth pled guilty to assault and battery. 9 The
prosecution objected to the judge continuing to hear the case, re-
quested a stay of the proceedings and moved to nolle prosequi the
case.9" The judge recused himself, and a second judge accepted
the guilty plea, denied the two remaining prosecutorial motions
and set the matter for disposition.91 The Commonwealth had, in
the meantime, secured an indictment of the youth on the mali-
cious wounding charge and filed a motion to quash the indictment
and a plea autrefois convict.92 The circuit judge concluded that
Virginia Code sections 16.1-241(A)(6), 19.2-5 and 19.2-186 con-
trolled the case, and that sections 16.1-241(A)(6) and 16.1-269.1
must be read together since they were enacted as part of the
same legislative package.93 Thus, the juvenile and domestic rela-
tions district court retained jurisdiction to hear the lesser misde-
meanor charge, and the circuit court proceedings had to be dis-
missed.94
As noted in last year's survey,96 the Virginia Court of Appeals
addressed a controversial issue in September 1999 in Chatman v.
Commonwealth96 when it determined that the insanity defense
applied to delinquency cases to diminish the youth's responsibil-
ity for the criminal offense.97 The court found "that the right to
86. Id.
87. Id. at 333-34.
88. Id. at 334.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 333.
93. Id. at 335.
94. Id.
95. Shepherd, supra note 6, at 1012.
96. 30 Va. App. 593, 518 S.E.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1999). The Supreme Court of Virginia
granted review on April 25, 2000.
97. Id. at 601, 518 S.E.2d at 851.
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assert an insanity defense is an essential of 'due process and fair
treatment' which is required at a juvenile delinquency adjudica-
tion." 8 The court acknowledged that "an adjudication of delin-
quency has wide and serious ramifications,"99 and remanded the
case for a decision as to whether Chatman was "entitled to a men-
tal health evaluation at state expense."
100
House Joint Resolution 680, enacted at the 1999 General As-
sembly Session, called on the Virginia Bar Association to conduct
a study regarding the applicability of "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity pleas" in juvenile delinquency proceedings and the proce-
dures which should follow such a plea.'0 ' The study took place,
with a report being made to the General Assembly,0 2 and a bill
was introduced to implement the recommendations of the study,
but it was carried over to the 2001 Session because of the pending
appeal in Chatman.°3
In Bostic v. Commonwealth, °4 the Virginia Court of Appeals
upheld the Campbell County Circuit Court's denial of the defen-
dant's request to impeach the juvenile victim while he was testi-
fying as a witness on the basis of his prior juvenile adjudications,
and held that this ruling did not violate Bostic's right to confron-
tation.'0 5 The court reaffirmed the prior holdings in Kiracofe v.
Commonwealth, °6 Moats v. Commonwealth, °7 and other similar
cases denying such impeachment in spite of the new argument
that "the primary focus of juvenile proceedings has changed from
rehabilitative to punitive."' The court noted that juvenile adju-
dications and dispositions may be used in connection with a spe-
cific attack on the credibility of a witness for bias, as where the
youth is still on probation or where he received a break for his
98. Id.
99. Id. at 599, 518 S.E.2d at 850.
100. Id. at 601, 518 S.E.2d at 851.
101. H.J. Res. 680, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999).
102. REPORT ON THE ADJUDICATION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS, H. Doc. No. 60 (2000).
103. H.B. 1260, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
104. 31 Va. App. 632, 525 S.E.2d 67 (Ct. App. 2000).
105. Id. at 636, 525 S.E.2d at 68.
106. 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957).
107. 12 Va. App. 349, 404 S.E.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1991).
108. Bostic, 31 Va. App. at 634, 525 S.E.2d at 68.
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agreement to testify.0 9
In an unusual case, the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction of a defendant for attempting to purchase a firearm as
a convicted felon because of the trial court's refusal to allow tes-
timony by the defendant that the juvenile court judge had ad-
vised him in 1994, when he was convicted of the felony charge,
that all records of the adjudications would be expunged once he
reached the age of eighteen."0 Although the judge's statement
was hearsay, it was not being offered for its truth, but rather to
establish the "verbal act" of its effect upon Parsons, and it was
thus admissible."' In Hutchins v. Commonwealth,"' the Virginia
Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, concluded that for the purposes
of the Virginia Speedy Trial Statute 13 the time began to run
when the juvenile court held a preliminary hearing and found
probable cause to certify the charges to the grand jury, and did
not stop until the first juror was sworn for voir dire, well beyond
the five month limitation prescribed." 4 In Heath v. Common-
wealth," '5 the en banc court decided that the defendant's speedy
trial rights had not been violated where much of the delay was at-
tributable to his motion for a psychiatric evaluation."6
In Hertz v. Times-World Corp.," ' the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia ruled that a petition for a writ of mandamus is not the ap-
propriate procedural device for challenging a juvenile court
judge's decision to close a hearing as opposed to a motion to inter-
109. Id. at 635, 525 S.E.2d at 69; see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Fulcher
v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 96, 306 S.E.2d 874 (1983). In two other cases, defendants un-
successfully sought to impeach juvenile witnesses based on their prior records, but did not
adequately preserve the issue for appellate review. Brant v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App.
268, 527 S.E.2d 476 (Ct. App. 2000); Boyce v. Commonwealth, No. 1463-99-4, 2000 Va.
App. LEXIS 477 (Ct. App. June 27, 2000). Also, although Rankins v. Commonwealth, 31
Va. App. 352, 523 S.E.2d 524 (Ct. App. 2000), involved a juvenile defendant, the issues
discussed in the case involve hearsay and confrontation clause issues unrelated to his
youth. Id. at 357-58, 523 S.E.2d at 526-27.
110. Parsons v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 576, 529 S.E.2d 810 (Ct. App. 2000).
111. Id. at 580, 529 S.E.2d at 812.
112. 30 Va. App. 574, 518 S.E.2d 838 (Ct. App. 1999).
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
114. Hutchins, 30 Va. App. at 576-77, 518 S.E.2d at 841. The juvenile court preliminary
hearing was on October 23, 1996, and voir dire did not begin until June 6, 1997. Id.
115. 32 Va. App. 176, 526 S.E.2d 798 (Ct. App. 2000).
116. Id. at 182, 526 S.E.2d at 801.
117. 259 Va. 599, 528 S.E.2d 458 (2000). The trial court's opinion may be found at 50
Va. Cir. 25 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Bedford County).
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vene in the proceedings."' Justice Koontz dissented in an opinion
joined by Justices Lacy and Kinser."9 The dissenting opinion
clearly reflects the view that "public access plays a significant
positive role in the functioning of these hearings despite the fact
that they are held in the juvenile court." 2 °
Commonwealth v. Johnson'21 is this year's continuation of the
Virginia Court of Appeals' high bar for suppression of a confes-
sion made by a juvenile. The Norfolk Circuit Court had sup-
pressed a seventeen-year-old's confession based on his waiver of
his Miranda rights, and the appellate court reversed. 22 Johnson
was a suspect in a robbery investigation and his grandmother,
who was his legal guardian, was summoned to the police station
with the youth and she signed the Miranda waiver form along
with her ward."2 The grandmother was then escorted out of the
interview room after being told that Johnson was not a suspect
and that he would be free to go in about two hours.Y
The interrogation began about 2:15 p.m., was suspended at
2:55 p.m., resumed at 4:35 p.m., was broken with a visit to the
crime scene from 6:00 to 6:25 p.m., resumed again at 8:50 p.m.
and concluded at 9:18 p.m. with the signing of a written state-
ment."'25 Johnson claimed he was "high" from smoking a mari-
juana cigarette shortly before the interrogation but the police offi-
cer said he discerned no problem with the youth.2 6 Johnson's
father and uncle came to the station during the interrogation but
were denied access to hiM127
The trial court found that Johnson was not deprived of any
physical comforts; that he was doing well in the eleventh grade of
school and appeared to be intelligent; that he had not had "appre-
ciable" contact with the police nor had he previously experienced
"police interrogation"; that he had smoked a marijuana "blunt"
118. Hertz, 259 Va. at 609-10, 528 S.E.2d at 463-64.
119. Id. at 610, 528 S.E.2d at 464 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 613, 528 S.E.2d at 465 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
121. No. 1244-99-1, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 624 (Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1999) (unpublished de-
cision).
122. Id. at *1.
123. Id. at *4.
124. Id. at*5.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *6.
127. Id.
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sometime on the day of his arrest; that he continued to be ques-
tioned after denying any involvement in the robbery; and that he
was deprived of the presence of his guardian. 28
The court also stated that the police tactic of excluding his
guardian violated the very purpose of guardianship. 29
The Virginia Court of Appeals applied the "totality of the cir-
cumstances"3 ° test, concluding that there had been a valid waiver
of Johnson's Miranda rights and that the confession was volun-
tary. '3 Although the fact that the police officer misled the
grandmother was "disconcerting," it "was immaterial to the vol-
untariness" of the confession. 3
2
There were no search and seizure cases during the past year,
although the General Assembly enacted legislation directing
school boards to adopt and revise, effective for the 2001-2002
school year, regulations governing student searches that are con-
sistent with Board of Education's recently issued guidelines. 3
In Atabaki v. Commonwealth,' a seventeen-year-old defen-
dant entered an Alford guilty plea in the Arlington County Cir-
cuit Court and was sentenced to the penitentiary for twelve years,
with four years suspended.'35 He subsequently sought to with-
draw his guilty plea or be resentenced in light of newly discovered
evidence of the victim's propensity for violence. 3 6 The trial court
considered the motion and denied it because there was no show-
ing of manifest injustice.' Atabaki also claimed that he misun-
derstood, based on the advice given him by counsel and the court,
who would be doing the sentencing if he proceeded to trial before
a jury."' He believed in light of the fact that he was a juvenile,
128. Id.
129. Id. at *7.
130. Id. at *8.
131. Id. at *9.
132. Id. at *11.
133. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-277.01:2 (Repl. Vol. 2000). For text of the Board of Educa-
tion's recently issued guidelines, see REPORT OF THE BD. OF EDUC., GUIDELINES FOR
STUDENT SEARCHES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFVA., H. Doc. No. 62 (2000).
134. No. 1411-98-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 89 (Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000) (unpublished deci-
sion).
135. Id. at *4.
136. Id. at *4-5.
137. Id. at *5.
138. Id. at *5-6.
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the jury, not the judge, would sentence him, and he contended
that the trial judge falsely conveyed the impression that he could
be sentenced as a juvenile.'39 The Virginia Court of Appeals de-
cided that the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the
motion for a new trial.'4° Judge Benton dissented, noting that the
advice given at trial was confusing, especially for a seventeen-
year-old youth, and at points legally erroneous.14 1
Legislation enacted by the General Assembly during the 2000
session did not substantially alter the Virginia juvenile justice
system. One change requires that detention orders "state the of-
fense for which the juvenile is being detained, and to the extent
practicable, other pending and previous charges." The statute
also alters one of the standards to be considered in determining
whether the juvenile should be released from "unreasonable dan-
ger to the person or property of others"'" to "a clear and substan-
tial threat to the person or property of others."' A bill also pro-
vided that
[t]eacher staffing ratios for regional or local detention homes shall be
based on a ratio of one teacher for every twelve beds based on the
capacity of the facility; however, if the previous year's average daily
attendance exceeds this bed capacity, the ratio shall be based on the
average daily attendance at the facility as calculated by the Depart-
ment of Education from the previous school year.'
45
Other legislation increased the caps for fees paid to court-
appointed counsel in indigent cases in annual increments contin-
gent upon the appropriation of funds to pay these fees. 46 The in-
creases were not included in the final budget for the first year of
the biennium, but there was about a sixty percent allocation for
the second year, so it appears that beginning in 2001 there will be
an increase in the cap for court-appointed cases in juvenile court
from $100 to $120.1 Virginia Code section 16.1-272 will now al-
139. Id.
140. Id. at *6-7.
14L Id. at *10 (Benton, J., dissenting).
142. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-248.1 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
143. Id. § 16.1-248.1(A)(1)(a) (Repi. Vol. 1999).
144. Id. (Cum. Supp. 2000).
145. Id. § 22.1-211 (Repl. Vol. 2000). This effectuated the reenactment clause found in
Chapter 511 of the 1999 Acts of Assembly.
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
147. Act of Apr. 4, 2000, ch. 436, 2000 Va. Acts 687, 688.
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low circuit courts to punish a juvenile convicted of a non-violent
felony by imposing and suspending an adult sentence conditioned
upon successful completion of terms and conditions as might be
imposed by a juvenile court." s The bill did not remove the circuit
court's ability to punish the juvenile as an adult.149
An omnibus drug bill requires that juveniles found delinquent
for a first drug offense be subject to periodic substance abuse
testing, drug treatment, and education, and mandates six months
extra time on a felony sentence if the mandatory drug assessment
indicates a substance abuse problem. 5 ° Among other things, the
bill also revises the penalty for violation of the "drug-free school
zone" law (possession with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of
a school or designated school bus stop) to include a one-year
minimum, mandatory term of incarceration for a second or sub-
sequent conviction.' 5 ' At the request of the Department of Juve-
nile Justice, a bill changed the criteria for commitment to the De-
partment. 52 Prior provisions of the Virginia Code provided,
somewhat ambiguously, that only a child older than ten years of
age may be committed to the Department, 53 and this legislation
changed the permissible age to eleven or older.'54 The bill also
provided for commitment to the Department for an offense which
would be a Class 1 misdemeanor only if the juvenile has been
previously convicted of three Class 1 misdemeanors or a felony,'55
while prior law allowed commitment for a Class 1 misdemeanor if
the prior conviction was a felony or a single Class 1 misde-
meanor.'56 It also clarified that abused and neglected children
may not be committed to the Department, and any juvenile who
is in the custody of the Department and is subsequently convicted
as an adult is to be transferred to the Department of Correc-
148. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
149. Id. The legislation appears to codify the holding of the Virginia Court of Appeals
last year in Jackson v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 418, 512 S.E.2d 838 (Ct. App. 1999).
The court held that the trial court had authority to impose a juvenile sentencing option as
a condition of the suspension of the prison sentence. Id. at 423-24, 512 S.E.2d at 841; see
also Shepherd, supra note 6, at 1012.
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.8:01 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
151. Id. § 18.2-255.2 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
152. Id. §§ 16.1-278.7, -278.8(14) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
153. Id. § 16.1-278.8(14) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
154. Id. (Cum. Supp. 2000).
155. Id.
156. Id. (Repl. Vol. 1999).
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tions. 57 In addition, amendments to several sections allow a court
to defer disposition and place a juvenile in the temporary custody
of the Department of Juvenile Justice to attend a boot camp, pro-
vided bed space is available and the juvenile has been found de-
linquent, has not previously been and is not currently being adju-
dicated delinquent or found guilty of a violent juvenile felony, has
not previously attended a boot camp or been committed to the
Department, and has been assessed as appropriate for boot
camp.15 Additional legislation provides that
[ilf a juvenile fourteen years of age or older is found to have commit-
ted an offense which if committed by an adult would be punishable
by confinement in a state or local correctional facility... , and the
court determines (i) that the juvenile has not previously been and is
not currently adjudicated delinquent or found guilty of a violent ju-
venile felony, (ii) that the interests of the juvenile and the commu-
nity require that the juvenile be placed under legal restraint or dis-
cipline, and (iii) that other placements authorized by this title will
not serve the best interests of the juvenile, then the court may order
the juvenile confined in a detention home or other secure facility for
juveniles for a period not to exceed six months .... The period of
confinement ordered may exceed thirty calendar days if the juvenile
has had an assessment completed... concerning the appropriate-
ness of the placement.' 5
9
Several bills addressed juvenile records. An amendment to Vir-
ginia Code section 16.1-299 allows law-enforcement agencies to
retain fingerprints and photographs of juveniles fourteen years
old or older charged with, but not convicted of, violent juvenile
felonies or ancillary crimes.16' Another change allows the De-
partment of Juvenile Justice to share confidential information re-
garding a child with persons having a legitimate interest (e.g.,
providing services to the child under a department contract or
under the Virginia Juvenile Community Crime Control Act or
release of the information for security purposes).'6 Virginia Code
section 16.1-301 was amended to allow law-enforcement agencies
to release records of a juvenile fourteen years of age or older
157. Id. § 16.1-278 (Cur. Supp. 2000).
158. Id. § 16.1-278.8(4)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000); see also id. §§ 16.1-
284.1, -292 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
159. Id. § 16.1-284.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
160. Id. § 16.1-299(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
161. Id. § 16.1-300 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
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charged with certain felonies.'62 Under prior law, this information
could be released only if the juvenile was charged with murder or
aggravated malicious wounding.6 ' The bill also allows release of
the records if the charge is felonious injury by mob, abduction,
malicious wounding, malicious wounding of a law-enforcement of-
ficer, felonious poisoning, adulteration of products, robbery, car-
jacking, rape, forcible sodomy, or object sexual penetration.' 14
Further legislation provides that a victim in a juvenile or adult
proceeding may not be excluded from the courtroom unless the
court determines that "the presence of the victim would impair
the conduct of a fair trial."'65 Finally, another bill provides that "a
copy of any court order that imposes a curfew or other restriction
on a juvenile may be provided to the chief law-enforcement officer
of the county or city wherein the juvenile resides."'66
One amendment to the Juvenile Community Crime Control Act
requires that the community-based services developed pursuant
to the Act be based on an annual review and objective assessment
of court-related data.'67 The biennial plan, required to be submit-
ted to the State Board of Juvenile Justice, must provide the pro-
jected number of juveniles that will not require secure detention
or state commitment because of the community-based services,
and each locality must submit a quarterly progress report to the
Department of Juvenile Justice. 6 '
Two minor amendments to the juvenile competency legislation
enacted in 1999 add licensed professional counselors to the list of
experts who may perform a juvenile forensic evaluation,'69 and
provide for the civil commitment to an adult facility of a person
who was charged with a crime when younger than eighteen, but
who reaches the age of eighteen during the time that the court
finds him unrestorable to competency and in need of inpatient
hospitalization. 7 °
One interesting amendment to the Virginia Code limits the ap-
162. Id. § 16.1-301 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
163. Id. (Repl. Vol. 1999).
164. Id. § 16.1-269.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
165. Id. § 16.1-302.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
166. Id. § 16.1-309.1(F) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
167. Id. § 16.1-309.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
168. Id. § 16.1-309.3(D) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
169. Id. §§ 16.1-356(A), -361 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
170. Id. § 16.1-358 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
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plication of the death penalty for a Class 1 felony conviction to
those who are sixteen years of age or older at the time of the of-
fense.' Amendments to the youthful offender provisions require
a suspended period of confinement in addition to the four years of
indeterminate commitment and also require confinement in a
state facility for youthful offenders. 72 Initial confinement must be
followed by at least one and one-half years of supervised parole, 73
and the legislation changes those eligible for indeterminate com-
mitment by excluding certain sex offenders and all misdemean-
ants74 (currently misdemeanors involving injury to persons or
property are included).7 5 The legislation also allows participation
of all who committed the offense prior to age twenty-one (current
law is limited to juveniles tried as adults and to persons who
committed the offense after becoming eighteen but before twenty-
one years of age). 76 The provision also adds specific program re-
quirements for youthful offender facilities.
177
Several Virginia Code provisions concerning offices on youth
were revised by amendments to the Delinquency Prevention and
Youth Development Act.7" Local youth services citizen boards are
required to participate actively with community representatives
in developing a comprehensive plan and to make formal recom-
mendations to the governing authority about the plan and its im-
plementation at least once a year. 79 Activities of the offices on
youth are standardized in the areas of assessment,'80 assisting in
planning and modifying services,' 8 ' collaborating in the develop-
ment and dissemination of local service inventories 82 and in iden-
tifying service gaps and potential funding sources.'83
In a somewhat tangential case, the Supreme Court of Virginia
171. Id. § 18.2-10(a) (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
172. Id. § 19.2-311(A) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 19.2-316.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
175. Id.
176. Id. § 19.2-311(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
177. Id. § 53.1-63(B) (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cure. Supp. 2000).
178. Id. §§ 66-28-30, -34, -35 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
179. Id. §§ 66-34 to -35 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
180. Id. § 66-35(1) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
181. Id. § 66-35(2) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
182. Id. § 66-35(3) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
183. Id. § 66-35(4) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
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ruled, in Commonwealth v. Luzik,'" that the state could assert its
sovereign immunity to prevent a suit by employees of the former
Department of Youth and Family Services alleging a violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act because of the Department's failure
to pay overtime to juvenile probation officers and others working
in court services units."8 5
III. ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER CARE, AND TERMINATION OF
RESIDUAL PARENTAL RIGHTS
An amendment to the family abuse statutory scheme provides
that a protective order may grant the petitioner use of a motor
vehicle owned solely by the petitioner, clarifying that this power
exists in a court in addition to the power to grant use of a motor
vehicle jointly owned by the parties."6
In Carter v. Crabtree,"7 the Virginia Court of Appeals con-
cluded that Crabtree did not file his appeal of the Commissioner's
decision sustaining the abuse determinations against him in a
timely fashion, and the circuit court thus did not have jurisdiction
to entertain the appeal.' In Beaton v. Virginia Department of
Social Services,'89 the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that a ju-
venile court's decision that Beaton's children were not neglected
was not binding on the department's administrative hearing offi-
cer. 9 ° Two other unpublished decisions upheld on appeal the
abuse or neglect determinations reached in the lower courts.'9 ' In
Ferguson v. City of Charleston,'92 the United States Court of Ap-
184. 259 Va. 198, 524 S.E.2d 871 (2000).
185. Id. at 208, 524 S.E.2d at 878.
186. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-253.1(A)(5), -279.1(A)(4) (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp.
2000).
187. No. 1437-98-3, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 515 (Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1999) (unpublished de-
cision).
188. Id. at *6-7.
189. No. 0917-99-1, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 172 (Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2000) (unpublished de-
cision).
190. Id. at *3-6.
191. Shepherd-Carper v. Roanoke City Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1935-99-3, 2000 Va.
App. LEXIS 56 (Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000) (unpublished decision); Hash v. Campbell Co. Dep't
of Soc. Servs., No. 1058-99-3, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 605 (Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1999) (unpub-
lished decision).
192. 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted 120 S. Ct. 1239 (2000). Oral argument
took place on October 4, 2000. For a sequence of events in this case, see
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peals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
upholding the use of urine screens for drugs with pregnant
women seen at the Medical University of South Carolina when
characteristics of cocaine use were observed during prenatal
care.
193
The General Assembly passed legislation at the 2000 Session
that places a medical laboratory on the same footing as a medical
facility for the purpose of allowing laboratory analysis results into
evidence. 94 This change would allow a laboratory analysis to be
admitted into evidence in child or family abuse cases with only an
affidavit of the analyst attesting to the truth and accuracy of the
results and would avoid requiring the analyst to testify.' 95
Other legislation requires the Virginia Department of Social
Services to implement a statewide child protective services differ-
ential response system for responding to reports of child abuse
and neglect.' 96 Rather than requiring a full-scale investigation of
every report, the reports would now be evaluated by the local de-
partment of social services and less serious reports would be
subject to a family assessment. 97 The emphasis is on offering
services rather than on making a determination of abuse or ne-
glect. In family assessments, no disposition would be entered into
the central registry.'9
Other legislation mandates that the State Board of Social
Services implement emergency regulations on out-of-family child
protective services joint investigations to be accomplished in con-
sultation with state agencies with oversight of the protection of
children. 99 That bill requires a report by the Commissioner of the
Department to the General Assembly standing committee over-
seeing these issues by September 30, 2000, outlining the recom-
mendations of the state board advisory committee that was set up
http//www.supremecourt.us.gov/docket/99-936.htm.
193. Id. at 483.
194. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-245.1 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
195. Id.
196. Id. § 63.1-248.2:1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000); see also id. § 2.1-380 (Repl.
Vol. 1995), §§ 63.1-209, -248.2, -248.7:1, -248.10, -248.13, -248.19 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum.
Supp. 2000).
197. Id. § 63.1-248.2:1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
198. Id. § 63.1-248.6:02(A)(6) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
199. Id. § 63.1-248.6(A) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
20001
960 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:939
to address all such out-of-family investigations.0 0 Further legisla-
tion deletes the requirement that the central registry of the
names of those persons who have been found to have abused or
neglected a child in an out-of-family situation also contain the
name of the abused child when the parent or guardian is not the
abuser.2"' If a child's name currently appears on the registry
without the consultation and permission of the parents or guardi-
ans for a founded case of abuse and neglect that does not name
the parents or guardians of the child as the abuser or neglector,
such parents or guardians may have the child's name removed by
written request to the department.0 2
By further bill, the multiple response child protective services
system pilot program that is underway in five jurisdictions of the
Commonwealth pursuant to legislation passed by the 1996 Gen-
eral Assembly, continues until July 1, 2002.203 The pilot program
provides an alternative response to reports of child abuse and ne-
glect other than the current single investigatory track.2 4
The flood of appellate decisions involving criminal prosecutions
for abuse and neglect continued unabated for yet another year. In
Clark v. Commonwealth, °5 the Virginia Court of Appeals agreed
that a trial court has the discretion to require the victim of an al-
leged sexual assault to "submit to an independent physical ex-
amination provided the defendant has made a threshold showing
of a compelling need or reason."20 6 In Santillo v. Common-
wealth, °7 the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that the due proc-
ess interest in privacy did not apply to non-consensual acts of
sodomy with a sixteen-year-old girl.208 In addition the court stated
that the state's sodomy statute was not unconstitutionally
vague.209 The Virginia Court of Appeals further decided in Will v.
Commonwealth210 that the Confrontation Clause of the United
200. Id.
201. Id. § 63.1-248.8 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
202. Id.
203. Id. § 63.1-248.18 editor's note (Cum. Supp. 2000).
204. Id; see also Robert E. Shepherd, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Legal Issues In-
volving Children, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1467, 1495-96 (1996).
205. 31 Va. App. 96, 521 S.E.2d 313 (Ct. App. 1999).
206. Id. at 109, 521 S.E.2d at 320.
207. 30 Va. App. 470, 517 S.E.2d 733 (Ct. App. 1999).
208. Id. at 480-81, 517 S.E.2d at 738-39.
209. Id. at 484, 517 S.E.2d at 740.
210. 31 Va. App. 571, 525 S.E.2d 37 (Ct. App. 2000).
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States Constitution was not violated by the trial court granting a
recess to allow the Commonwealth's attorney to talk with a testi-
fying child victim.21' A panel of the Virginia Court of Appeals
ruled in Moyer v. Commonwealth212 that the use of a teacher's
diaries as evidence against him for taking indecent liberties with
a minor violated the privilege against self-incrimination,213 and
that buttocks are not "sexual parts" within the meaning of the
criminal code.2"4 The court, sitting en banc, reversed the panel
and affirmed the convictions."' In Barrett v. Commonwealth,1 6 a
mother's convictions for felony murder and felony child neglect
were reversed because of the trial court's refusal to instruct the
jury on the meaning of "willful" in the context of felony abuse or
neglect.217 In Lane v. Commonwealth,1' the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the convictions of a man for the rape and sodomy
of his stepdaughter219 and ruled that the trial court properly ad-
mitted testimony of experts regarding the dynamics of victim re-
cantation and the causes and effects of post-traumatic stress dis-
order.220 The court of appeals addressed other issues not specific
to children in the context of other cases where children were vic-
tims of criminal actions.22" ' The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
211. Id. at 580, 525 S.E.2d at 42.
212. 30 Va. App. 744, 520 S.E.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1999).
213. Id. at 754, 520 S.E.2d at 376.
214. Id. at 756, 520 S.E.2d at 377.
215. Moyer v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 8, 13, 531 S.E.2d 580, 582-83 (Ct. App.
2000).
216. 32 Va. App. 693, 530 S.E.2d 437 (Ct. App. 2000).
217. Id. at 699, 530 S.E.2d at 440.
218. No. 2161-98-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 544 (Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1999) (unpublished
decision).
219. Id. at*11.
220. Id. at *4-7.
221. See Semple v. City of Moundsville, 963 F. Supp. 1416 (N.D. W. Va. 1999), affd,
195 F.3d 708 (4th Cir. 1999); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 529 S.E.2d 570
(2000); Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 0411-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 353 (Ct. App. May
9, 2000) (unpublished decision); Renoir v. Commonwealth, No. 2097-98-3, 2000 Va. App.
LEXIS 236 (Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2000) (unpublished decision); Shifflett v. Commonwealth,
No. 2600-98-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 150 (Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2000) (unpublished decision);
Stoudt v. Commonwealth, Nos. 2386-98-4, 2387-98-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 92 (Ct. App.
Feb. 15, 2000) (unpublished decision); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 495, 525
S.E.2d 1 (Ct. App. 2000); DeAmicis v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 437, 524 S.E.2d 151
(Ct. App. 2000); Majette v. Commonwealth, No. 2307-98-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 31 (Ct.
App. Jan. 27, 2000) (unpublished decision); Perkins v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 326,
523 S.E.2d 512 (Ct. App. 2000); Brandon v. Commonwealth, No. 2434-98-2, 2000 Va. App.
LEXIS 14 (Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2000) (unpublished decision); Sanderson v. Commonwealth,
No. 1555-98-1, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 9 (Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2000) (unpublished decision);
Rothwell v. Commonwealth, No. 1342-98-1, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 2 (Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2000)
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granted a writ of habeas corpus to a North Carolina prisoner con-
victed of raping his step-granddaughter in Bell v. Jarvis222 be-
cause his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that
the state court erred in closing the courtroom over the prisoner's
objection.223 In Commonwealth v. Bennett,21 the Page County Cir-
cuit Court ruled that Virginia Code section 18.2-67.9, allowing
the use of closed circuit television in child abuse prosecutions
with children under the age of thirteen, applies to a child who
meets that age criterion at the date of the trial, not at the time of
the incident.225
A comprehensive bill addressing foster care and permanency
planning provides that when it is necessary to remove a child
from his home he may be placed with a relative or other inter-
ested individual, including grandparents, in lieu of placement
with a local department of social services. 226 The bill establishes
standards for such placements which are appropriate for each
stage of the dependency process.227 The bill also creates a new
permanent goal known as "another planned permanent living ar-
rangement" for foster children who require long-term residential
treatment.228 Annual foster care review hearings must be held for
children whose parental rights have been terminated until a final
order of adoption is entered, instead of until they are placed for
adoption.229 The bill also modifies the child's objection to a termi-
nation of parental rights.23 °
A number of unpublished Virginia Court of Appeals decisions
address situations where parental rights of an incarcerated par-
ent are being terminated. There is no per se rule in Virginia that
(unpublished decision); Booker v. Commonwealth, No. 1603-98-1, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS
471 (Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1999) (unpublished decision); Clark v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App.
406, 517 S.E.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1999); Felder v. Commonwealth, No. 1617-98-2, 1999 Va.
App. LEXIS 474 (Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1999) (unpublished decision); Mathews v. Common-
wealth, 30 Va. App. 412, 517 S.E.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1999); Terry v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.
App. 192, 516 S.E.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1999); Bartz v. Commonwealth, No. 1374-98-2, 1999
Va. App. LEXIS 408 (Ct. App. June 29, 1999) (unpublished decision).
222. 198 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 1999).
223. Id. at 444.
224. 48 Va. Cir. 190 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Page County).
225. Id. at 191-92.
226. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-252(F)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
227. Id.
228. Id. § 16.1-282.1(A2)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
229. Id. § 16.1-282.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
230. Id. § 16.1-283(G) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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states that incarceration will justify termination of residual pa-
rental rights without any other facts, but the court of appeals has
stated that "[it is clearly not in the best interests of a child to
spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even
if, a parent will be capable of resuming his responsibilities.""'
Thus, during the past year the court has upheld the trial court's
termination of parental rights in every case involving an incar-
cerated parent. 2 Similarly, although the existence of a mental
disability or mental illness will not automatically result in the
termination of residual parental rights, the existence of such,
coupled with other factors, almost invariably results in termina-
tion."' A number of other unpublished memorandum opinions
from the Virginia Court of Appeals upheld decisions terminating
parental rights, especially where minimal efforts were made to
remedy the situations that led to the abuse or neglect,23 14 where a
231. Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d
492, 495 (Ct. App. 1990).
232. Terry v. Roanoke City Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 3091-99-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS
420 (Ct. App. June 6, 2000) (unpublished decision); Pennybacker v. Spotsylvania County
Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 2599-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 273 (Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2000) (un-
published decision); Stergiou v. Frederick County Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0156-99-4, 2000
Va. App. LEXIS 202 (Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2000) (unpublished decision); Marlowe v. Chester-
field/Colonial Heights Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1913-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 104 (Ct.
App. Feb. 15, 2000) (unpublished decision); Fields v. Hopewell Dep't of Soc. Servs., No.
1936-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 58 (Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000) (unpublished decision); Fore-
man v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., No. 1432-99-4, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 675
(Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1999) (unpublished decision); Eaton v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. for County of
Bedford, No. 0868-99-3, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 443 (Ct. App. July 20, 1999) (unpublished
decision).
233. See Patterson v. Nottoway County Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 2528-99-2, 2000 Va.
App. LEXIS 234 (Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2000) (unpublished decision); Harold Jackson v. Rich-
mond Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0648-99-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 702 (Ct. App. Dec. 28,
1999) (unpublished decision); Mary Jackson v. Richmond Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0226-99-
2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 697 (Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1999) (unpublished decision); Murphy v.
Norfolk Div. of Soc. Servs., No. 1474-99-1, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 663 (Ct. App. Dec. 7,
1999) (unpublished decision); Harvey v. Lynchburg Div. of Soc. Servs., No. 2691-98-3, 1999
Va. App. LEXIS 561 (Ct. App. Oct. 5, 1999) (unpublished decision).
234. Cook v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Mecklenburg County, No. 2256-99-2, 2000 Va. App.
LEXIS 444 (Ct. App. June 20, 2000) (unpublished decision); Terry, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS
420; Fisher v. Warren County Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 2860-99-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS
403 (Ct. App. May 30, 2000) (unpublished decision); Chasem v. Fairfax County Dep't of
Family Serve., No. 2537-99-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 339 (Ct. App. May 9, 2000) (unpub-
lished decision); Sawyers v. Tazewell Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1605-99-3, 2000 Va. App.
LEXIS 346 (Ct. App. May 9, 2000) (unpublished decision); Ripley v. Charlottesville Dep't
of Soc. Servs., No. 2879-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 307 (Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2000) (unpub-
lished decision); DiMauro v. Virginia Beach Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1533-99-1, 2000 Va.
App. LEXIS 267 (Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2000) (unpublished decision); Tibbits v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. for Henrico County, No. 2487-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 274 (Ct. App. Apr. 11,
2000) (unpublished decision); Baker v. Fredericksburg Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1089-99-2,
2000 Va. App. LEXIS 203 (Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2000) (unpublished decision); Cook v. Peters-
burg Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1385-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 165 (Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2000)
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parent did little to protect the child or children from another abu-
sive caretaker,23 5 where there was unremedied substance abuse
by the parent23 or where a parent was convicted of a serious fel-
ony involving his or her child.2"7
The 2000 General Assembly repealed the prior chapter of Vir-
ginia Code Title 63.1 on adoption2 3' and reorganized the sections
into six separate articles of a new chapter. 39 The new articles are:
general provisions,24 ° which applies to all types of adoptions;
agency adoptions;" parental placement adoptions;4 2 stepparent
adoptions;2' adult adoptions;2" and records.2"5 Prior to this
change, all of the types of adoptions were lumped into the same
Virginia Code sections, creating confusion among the courts, par-
ties and agencies involved. The changes separate each type of
adoption into individual articles which clearly identify the proce-
dures necessary to complete the process.2"6 There were no policy
changes in the legislation, only a reorganization of the prior
law.247
(unpublished decision); Eckley v. Virginia Beach Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1863-99-1, 2000
Va. App. LEXIS 59 (Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000) (unpublished decision); Wilson v. Alexandria
Div. of Soc. Servs., No. 1839-99-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 57 (Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000) (unpub-
lished decision); Lewis v. Fredericksburg Dep't of Soc. Servs., No, 1121-99-2, 1999 Va. App.
LEXIS 651 (Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1999) (unpublished decision); Bivins v. New Kent County
Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0304-99-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 612 (Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1999) (un-
published decision); Malave v. Fairfax County Dep't of Family Servs., No. 2708-98-4, 1999
Va. App. LEXIS 579 (Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1999) (unpublished decision); Smith v. Roanoke
City Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0830-99-3, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 554 (Ct. App. Oct. 5, 1999)
(unpublished decision); Terry v. Franklin County Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1527-99-3, 1999
Va. App. LEXIS 567 (Ct. App. Oct. 5, 1999) (unpublished decision); In re Neblett, 50 Va.
Cir. 457 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Richmond City).
235. DiMauro, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 267; Eckley, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 59; Calloway v.
Bedford County Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1841-99-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 209 (Ct. App.
Nov. 23, 1999) (unpublished decision).
236. Woolfolk v. Loudoun County Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 2715-99-4, 2000 Va. App.
LEXIS 402 (Ct. App. May 30, 2000) (unpublished decision); Howard v. Charlottesville
Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 1275-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 364 (Ct. App. May 16, 2000).
237. Johnson v. Roanoke City Dep't ofSoc. Servs., No. 0604-00-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS
471 (Ct. App. June 27, 2000) (unpublished decision).
238. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
239. Id. §§ 63.1-219.7 to -219.55 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
240. Id. §§ 63.1-219.7 to -219.27 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
241. Id. §§ 63.1-219.28 to -219.36 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
242. Id. §§ 63.1-219.37 to -219.47 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
243. Id. §§ 63.1-219.48 to -219.49 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
244 Id. §§ 63.1-219.50 to -219.51 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
245. Id. §§ 63.1-219.52 to -219.55 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
246. See id. §§ 63.1-219.7 to -219.55 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
247. See id.
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Other legislation requires the local board of social services or
child-placing agency to give adoptive parents information about
the child's eligibility for subsidy,2" the child's special needs, 9 the
current and potential impact of these needs and the appeal proc-
ess.25° The law also clarifies that the local board that initiated the
adoption assistance agreement continues to be responsible for
subsidy payments if the adoptive parents move to another juris-
diction."'
Companion cases involving a mother and father addressed
their criminal prosecutions for attempting to sell their infant
daughter.2 The Virginia Court of Appeals found the evidence
sufficient to support the convictions for solicitation of money in
connection with placement or adoption and of conspiracy where it
showed several efforts to secure money in exchange for the
child.5 These efforts included one attempt where the parents
agreed to give the baby to a Texas couple for three thousand dol-
lars and the mother attempted to have the baby's birth certificate
delivered while that couple was present. 4
Two other unpublished cases dealt with the unreasonable
withholding of consent to adoption by an incarcerated father in
one case, 255 and by a mentally impaired mother in the other. 6 In
both cases the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts'
decisions granting the adoption over the objection of the parent.257
IV. EDUCATION
The United States Supreme Court revisited the issue of stu-
248. Id. § 63.1-238.3(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
249. Id. § 63.1-238.3(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
250. Id. § 63.1-238.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
251. Id. § 63.1-238.3(B)-(C) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
252. Nathan Combs v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 802, 520 S.E.2d 400 (Ct. App.
1999); Lillie Combs v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 778, 520 S.E.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999).
253. Nathan Combs, 30 Va. App. at 810, 520 S.E.2d at 403; Lillie Combs, 30 Va. App.
at 787, 520 S.E.2d at 392.
254. Nathan Combs, 30 Va. App. at 807, 520 S.E.2d at 392; Lillie Combs, 30 Va. App.
at 784, 520 S.E.2d at 391.
255. Peters v. Hagerman, No. 2901-98-4, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 365 (Ct. App. June 22,
1999) (unpublished decision).
256. Mills v. Mills, No. 0884-99-4, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 259 (Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2000)
(unpublished decision).
257. Mills, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 259, at *1; Peters, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 365, at *2.
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dent prayer in a public school setting in the case of Santa Fe In-
dependent School District v. Doe,258 where students delivered
prayers prior to high school football games pursuant to school
policy." 9 Until 1995, a student council chaplain elected by the
student body delivered a prayer over the public address system
prior to every football game at Santa Fe High School in Texas.
A lawsuit filed by students and their parents challenged the prac-
tice and the school district adopted a new policy authorizing two
elections-one to determine whether the students at the school
wished to have prayers at the games and a second, if the first vote
was in the affirmative, to select the student representative to de-
liver the invocation. 26 1 The district court had permitted the prac-
tice to continue, but only with nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
prayer.262 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the prayer pol-
icy to be constitutionally flawed, even as modified by the lower
court.
2 63
The Supreme Court concluded that the case was controlled by
the 1992 decision in Lee v. Weisman,2 4 the graduation prayer
case, and said that any message delivered on school property, at
school-sponsored events, "over the school's public address system,
by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervi-
sion of school faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that explic-
itly and implicitly encourages public prayer" could not be charac-
terized as private speech.265 Despite the seemingly voluntary
nature of attendance at a high school football game, the Court
pointed out that attendance was mandatory for certain stu-
dents-the football team, the band and the cheerleaders-and the
pressure was strong on other students.266 The Court reasoned
that students should not have to choose between attending a
game or participating in religious ritual.267 Even if attendance at
the game was optional, "the delivery of a pre-game prayer has the
improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act
of religious worship."268
258. 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
259. Id. at 2271.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 2272.
262. Id. at 2271.
263. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999).
264. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
265. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2279.
266. Id. at 2280.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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In another important First Amendment case, Mitchell v.
Helms, 269 the United States Supreme Court ruled that there was
no constitutional violation presented by the use of Title I funds to
purchase library and media materials, computer hardware and
software, and other instructional materials for students in both
public schools and secular and religious non-public schools.270 The
funds and equipment were allocated on an equal per-student ba-
sis regardless of the nature of the school.
2 1
In Koenick v. Felton,272 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a Maryland statute providing for public school holidays
on the Friday before Easter through the Monday following the
religious holiday was constitutional and did not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment. 3
In hotly debated action, the Virginia General Assembly revised
pre-existing law that authorized school boards to establish min-
utes of silence for meditation, prayer or other silent activity to
now require daily observation of a one-minute period of silence in
every classroom in the public schools in Virginia. 4 The require-
ment that "the teacher responsible for each classroom shall take
care that all pupils remain seated and silent and make no dis-
tracting display" during this time is retained, but the students
may "meditate, pray, or engage in any other silent activity that
does not interfere with, distract, or impede other pupils in the
like exercise of individual choice."275 The Attorney General of Vir-
ginia also issued an opinion upholding prayers before local school
board meetings. 6
In Lovern v. Edwards,277 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld a district court's dismissal of a noncustodial father's law-
suit challenging a school's insistence that he schedule meetings to
269. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
270. Id. at 2537-38. See generally Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20
U.S.C. §§ 7301-7373 (1994).
27L Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2537 (following Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)).
272. 190 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 1999).
273. Id. at 261. Once the teacher challenging the statute left her employment as a pub-
lic school teacher, she had no further standing to pursue her Equal Protection Clause
claim. Id. at 261 n.1.
274. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
275. Id. The Office of the Attorney General is authorized by the legislation to intervene
in any case, and must provide legal counsel for the defense of this provision. Id.
276. Educ.: Powers & Duties ofSch. Bds., Op. Atty Gen. No. 00-002 (Mar. 13, 2000).
277. 190 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 1999).
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discuss his children in advance so that the custodial mother could
be present. 8 In Brown v. Brown,27 9 the Virginia Court of Appeals
upheld a circuit court ruling denying a mother sole or joint legal
custody of her children and refusing to order the father to discon-
tinue home-schooling them.280
There were not as many cases dealing with children with dis-
abilities in a school setting in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
this year as usual, although in Baird v. Rose,"8' the court ruled
that a Fairfax County high school student and her parents stated
an American with Disabilities Act claim when they alleged that
the principal had discriminated against the girl by excluding her
from the school's show choir because of absenteeism associated
with her clinical depression.8 The court concluded that a valid
claim could rest on proof that a "disability was a motivating
cause-as opposed to the sole cause-of discrimination."8 3
Three Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cases this past year ad-
dressed the lingering effects of historic school segregation and ju-
dicial efforts to purge those effects.2" In Tuttle v. Arlington
County School Board,28 5 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that the school board's efforts to achieve diversity, rather
than to remedy past discrimination, were flawed by its use of a
lottery for admission to alternative kindergartens so that children
from under-represented groups were given weighted lottery num-
bers.286 Similarly, in Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public
Schools,287 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a
Maryland school used an unconstitutional transfer policy that
weighted race more heavily than other factors to achieve bal-
anced diversity.288 Finally, in Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
278. Id. at 650-51.
279. 30 Va. App. 532, 518 S.E.2d 336 (Ct. App. 1999).
280. Id. at 535, 518 S.E.2d at 337.
281. 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999).
282. Id. at 473.
283. Id. at 468.
284. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 211 F.3d 853 (4th Cir. 2000); Eisen-
berg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999); Tuttle v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
285. 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
286. Id. at 707.
287. 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999).
288. Id. at 133.
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Board of Education,8 9 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
clined to bypass the normal three-judge panel procedure and go
immediately to an en banc review of a long-standing school de-
segregation case.29°
The Winchester Circuit Court ruled in Woods v. Winchester
School Board29 that a school board may expel a student for
making a bomb threat even after he has withdrawn from school
and enrolled in another school system.292 Furthermore, in McLean
v. Hatrick,29 the Loudoun County Circuit Court found that a
fourth grade student and his parents were given adequate notice
of a hearing prior to suspension from school for possession of a toy
plastic gun.294 The Attorney General of Virginia opined that the
propriety of the use of drug-sniffing dogs to search the person of
students attending public schools depends on the facts supporting
a suspicionless search and the unobtrusiveness of the search it-
self.25 As noted previously, the General Assembly directed school
boards to adopt and revise, effective for the 2001-2002 school
year, regulations governing student searches that are consistent
with the Board of Education's recently issued guidelines.296 Leg-
islation enacted in 2000 defines "school property" for the purpose
of mandatory expulsion for possession of firearms on school prop-
erty as any school owned or leased real property or vehicle and a
vehicle operated by or on behalf of the school board.297 A new en-
actment, based on legislation from other states, requires that
"each school board shall include, in its standards of student con-
duct, prohibitions against profane or obscene language or con-
duct."29' Another provision permits local school boards to
require any student who has been found, in accordance with the pro-
cedures set forth in [Virginia Code section] 22.1-277, to have been in
possession of, or under the influence of, drugs or alcohol on a school
289. 211 F.3d 853 (4th Cir. 2000).
290. Id. at 854.
291. 49 Va. Cir. 330 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Winchester City).
292. Id. at 330.
293. No. 18910 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 2, 2000) (Loudon County). This case is scheduled to
be reported in volume 52 of the Virginia Circuit Court Opinions.
294. Id.
295. Op. to Hon. Charles R. Hawking (Jan. 31, 2000).
296. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-277.01:2 (Repl. Vol. 2000); see also REPORT OF THE BD. OF
EDUC., supra note 133.
297. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000); id. § 22.1-277.01 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
298. Id. § 22.1-277.02:1 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
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bus, on school property, or at a school-sponsored activity in violation
of school board policies, to undergo evaluation for drug or alcohol
abuse, or both, and, if recommended by the evaluator and with the
consent of the student's parent, to participate in a treatment pro-
gram.
2 9 9
Conduct involving firebombs, explosive materials or devices,
hoax explosive devices, chemical bombs, or other incendiary de-
vices on a school bus, on school property or at a school-sponsored
activity and bomb threats or false bomb threats made against
school personnel or involving school property or school buses were
added to those incidents to be reported to school principals or
their designees."° ° Another reporting statute authorizes law-
enforcement officers to report to school principals any suspected
violations of the Drug Control Act by students that "occurred on a
school bus, on school property or at a school-sponsored activity."3 0 '
One enacted bill provides that a juvenile and domestic rela-
tions court, upon finding "that a parent has willfully and unrea-
sonably failed to accompany a suspended student to meet with
school officials" to discuss improving the student's behavior, "or
upon the student's receiving a second suspension or being ex-
pelled," may order not only the student or his parent, but both
parents if they have legal and physical custody, "to participate in
such programs or such treatment," including "parenting counsel-
ing or a mentoring program," as the court deems appropriate to
improve the student's behavior.3 2 Another bill requires a juvenile
court to order the denial of driving privileges for at least thirty
days to any child at least thirteen years old upon a finding that
the child has failed to comply with certain school attendance and
parent-school conference meeting requirements.0 3
299. Id. § 22.1-277.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000). The Virginia Attorney General had expressed
the opinion that a school board lacked the authority to require parents to pay for a testing
and treatment program as a condition to granting excused absences to pupils suspended
for substance abuse. Op. to Hon. Joseph V. Gartlan, Jr. (Jan. 11, 2000).
300. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-47, 22.1-280.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2000). The principal or his
designee is to report all such incidents to the division superintendent, who must relay an
annual report to the Department of Education pursuant to Virginia Code section 22.1-
280.1(C). School principals must also report these incidents to law-enforcement officials
pursuant to Virginia Code section 22.1-280.1(D). Id. § 22.1-280.1(C)-(D) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
301. Id. § 22.1-280.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
302. Id. § 22.1-279.3(G) (Repl. Vol. 2000). In addition, the court may order both the
student and his parents to be subject to such conditions and limitations as the court deems
appropriate for the supervision, care, and rehabilitation of the student or the parents. Id.
303. Id. § 16.1-278.9(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cure. Supp. 2000). The measure provides
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In School Board of Portsmouth v. Colander,"°4 the Supreme
Court of Virginia ruled that a school system could not be held li-
able for damages for the actions of a teacher in secretly video-
taping the plaintiff student in various stages of undress where
there was no evidence of deliberate indifference to the risk of such
behavior by the school board."5 A federal district court held in
Baynard v. Lawson. that parents do not have a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in their own names against a school su-
perintendent for failing to warn them and others of the com-
plaints brought against their son's teacher for alleged sexual mo-
lestation.0 7 The court held that the son clearly has a claim for
any direct injury he suffered but there is no separate parental
cause of action.0 The Department of Social Services is now re-
quired to respond to requests by local school boards in cases
where there is no match within the central registry of a founded
complaint of child abuse or neglect regarding applicants for em-
ployment within ten business days, whereas in cases where there
is a match, the Department must respond within thirty business
days.30 9
Other important 2000 legislation includes the revision of vari-
ous statutes addressing evidence of residence in the school divi-
sion for public school enrollment of homeless pupils.3 10 Persons
deemed to reside in a school division now include those who lack
a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence and [have] a pri-
mary nighttime residence located within the school division, that is:
(a) a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designed to
provide temporary living accommodations ... ; (b) an institution that
provides a temporary residence for individuals intended to be insti-
tutionalized; or (c) a public or private place not designed for, or ordi-
narily used as, a regular sleeping accommodation for human be-
ings.
Another bill permits the creation of residential charter schools
for at-risk students by a single school division or by two or more
for restricted licenses to be issued upon demonstration of hardship. Id. This represents yet
another instance of a legislative mandate being issued to judges which restricts their exer-
cise of discretion.
304. 258 Va. 417, 519 S.E.2d 374 (1999).
305. Id. at 423, 519 S.E.2d at 377.
306. 76 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. Va. 1999).
307. Id. at 689.
308. Id.
309. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 22.1-296.4, 63.1-248.8 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
310. Id. §§ 22.1-3, -4.1, -270 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
311. Id. § 22.1-3 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
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school divisions as a joint school,312 and legislation also clarified
that school divisions may authorize the creation of regional char-
ter schools to be operated and chartered by two or more partici-
pating school boards.313 This bill emphasizes that charter schools
are public schools, and that charter schools, as public schools, are
subject to the requirements of the Standards of Quality, including
the Standards of Learning and the Standards of Accreditation.3 4
Yet another bill established that the guidelines for the at-risk
four-year-old preschool program may be differentiated according
to the agency delivering the services in order to comply with vari-
ous federal or state requirements and that the guidelines for the
programs delivered by the public schools must require certain
specific requirements.1 5
Other controversial legislation required local school boards to
develop and implement policies no later than January 1, 2001,
to ensure that public school students are not required to convey or
deliver any materials that (i) advocate the election or defeat of any
candidate for elective office, (ii) advocate the passage or defeat of any
referendum question, or (iii) advocate the passage or defeat of any
matter pending before a local school board, local governing body or
the General Assembly of Virginia or the Congress of the United
States.
316
A less volatile bill conformed Virginia law to the requirements
of the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
("FERPA")317 by directing schools to "annually notify parents of
students currently enrolled and in attendance of their rights un-
der [FERPAI ... and related regulations.""3
312. Id. §§ 22.1-26, -212.5, -212.7 to -212.9, -212.13, -212.14 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
313. Id. §§ 22.1-26, -212.5 to -212.15 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
314. Id.
315. Id. § 22.1-199.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
316. Id. § 22.1-278.3 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
317. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1994).
318. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-289(D) (Repl. Vol. 2000). Specifically, Virginia Code section
22.1-289(D) provides:
[A] school responding to a request for the transfer of [a student's] scholastic
record from another school division need not provide written notice of the
transfer... to the parent .... or to a student who is eighteen years of age or
older, if the school has previously included in the annual notice.., a state-
ment that it forwards such records to such requesting school divisions.
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V. MENTAL HEALTH
A recent Virginia Attorney General's opinion stated that a
magistrate lacked the authority to issue an emergency custody
order under Virginia Code section 37.1-67.01 "if the person be-
lieved to be mentally ill and in need of hospitalization is a mi-
nor."319 The General Assembly then enacted legislation at the
2000 Session to authorize magistrates to issue such emergency
custody orders for juveniles and admit the youth for inpatient
treatment.320
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
In Troxell v. Granville,32' the United States Supreme Court
ruled that Washington's child visitation statute was overly broad
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the extent that it permitted a court to grant visitation rights to
grandparents over the objection of a surviving custodial parent.322
The Court's holding was complicated by the existence of a plural-
ity opinion for four justices authored by Justice O'Connor,323 sepa-
rate concurring opinions by Justices Souter32' and Thomas,325 and
separate dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens, 26 Scalia,327 and
Kennedy.ss The diversity of opinions make it difficult to apply the
decision to other cases, and Justice O'Connor's opinion for four
justices is a fairly narrow one limited to the Washington statute
itself. 29 However, she opined that "the Due Process Clause does
not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents
to make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge be-
319. 1999 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 129, 131.
320. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-340 (Cum. Supp. 2000). Section 37.1-67.01, regarding emer-
gency custody orders, was added to the Virginia Code in 1995, but the cross reference was
not picked up in the Psychiatric Inpatient Treatment of Minors Act in Title 16.1. Id. §
37.1-67.01 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
321. 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
322. Id. at 2063-64.
323. Id. at 2057.
324. Id. at 2065.
325. Id. at 2067.
326. Id. at 2068.
327. Id. at 2074.
328. Id. at 2075.
329. Id. at 2064.
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lieves a 'better' decision could be made."33° However, the Spotsyl-
vania County Circuit Court held in Decatur v. Eskam33' that a
court could award visitation rights to grandparents where their
son, the child's father, was dead, the mother did not oppose visi-
tation, and the best interests of the child were served by the visi-
tation.3
32
Gonzalez v. Reno3 13 settled a very contentious event in Ameri-
can life, where Elian Gonzalez's relatives in Miami argued for the
custody and immigrant status of Elian Gonzalez-a six-year-old
boy rescued out of the ocean.334 The court ruled for the father on
the narrower basis of "the separation of powers under our consti-
tutional system of government, a statute enacted by Congress,
the permissible scope of executive discretion under that statute,
and the limits on judicial review of the exercise of that executive
discretion."335 The Virginia Court of Appeals wrote another chap-
ter in the long-playing custody and visitation saga of a lesbian
mother pitted against her mother when it upheld the trial court
order excluding all contact between the child and the mother's
companion and refused expanded visitation rights.336 In May v.
Grandy,337 the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial
court's action changing the surname of a child on the motion of
the mother where the father had not maintained contact with the
girl and the change was in her best interest.33 In Rowland v.
Shurbutt,339 the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed an order
granting a change of name to that of the biological father of a
child born to a woman married to another man because the action
330. Id.
331. 49 Va. Cir. 357 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Spotsylvania County).
332. Id. at 359. The court cited Williams v. Williams, 256 Va. 19, 501 S.E.2d 417
(1998), affg 24 Va. App. 778, 485 S.E.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1997), but distinguished that case
and relied on the later case of Dotson v. Hylton, 29 Va. App. 635, 513 S.E.2d 901 (Ct. App.
1999).
333. 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000), reh'g denied, 215 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 2737 (2000).
334. Id. at 1344-46.
335. Id. at 1344.
336. Bottoms v. Bottoms, No. 0589-98-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 402, at *8-10 (Ct. App.
June 29, 1999) (unpublished decision). See generally Bottoms v. Bottoms, 249 Va. 410, 457
S.E.2d 102 (1995).
337. 259 Va. 629, 528 S.E.2d 105 (2000).
338. Id. at 632-33, 528 S.E.2d at 107.
339. 259 Va. 305, 525 S.E.2d 917 (2000).
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was not proven to be in the child's best interests.340 Finally, in
Taylor v. Commonwealth,34' the Virginia Court of Appeals held
that a person who assists her fianc6 in abducting his illegitimate
child from the mother does not share any legal excuse the fianc6
may have in a criminal prosecution.342
A court is not required to appoint a guardian ad litem to repre-
sent a child in a case initiated by a petition to change custody
even where the petition alleges abuse by the custodian, because it
is not a petition alleging that the child is abused or neglected un-
der the juvenile code where such an appointment is mandated."4
In Miller v. Easter,3' the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed a
suspension of visitation for an incarcerated father because the de-
cision was based on the hearsay testimony by the mother about
her daughter's allegations of sexual abuse. 45 In Tyson v. Tyson, 46
the Fairfax County Circuit Court awarded reasonable fees to the
guardian ad litem for the couple's children and apportioned the
fees between the parents based on the income share percent-
ages.
347
An amendment to the Comprehensive Services Act for At-Risk
Youth and Families ("CSA")3  created the new Office of Compre-
hensive Services for At-Risk Youth and Families,349 under the
lead of the Secretary of Health and Human ResourcesY.3 " That of-
fice will assume the responsibilities of the former state manage-
ment team to "promote and support cooperation and collaboration
in the provision of services to troubled and at-risk youths and
their families at the state and local levels," and will also provide
340. Id. at 309, 525 S.E.2d at 919. The court also concluded that the jurisdiction over
the appeal lay with it because it was not a matter relating to "control or disposition of a
child" in the court of appeals statute. Id. at 307, 525 S.E.2d at 918 (quoting VA. CODE ANN.
§ 17.1-405(3)(e) (Repl. Vol. 1996)).
341. 31 Va. App. 54, 521 S.E.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1999) (en banc).
342. See id. at 64, 521 S.E.2d at 297.
343. Santoro v. Owens, No. 1801-99-1, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 55, at *4 (Ct. App. Feb. 8,
2000) (unpublished decision).
344. No. 2094-99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 375 (Ct. App. May 16, 2000) (unpublished
decision).
345. Id. at *5.
346. 49 Va. Cir. 386 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Fairfax County).
347. Id. at 388.
348. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-746, -748, -752, -759, -759.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp.
2000).
349. Id. § 9-6.25.3 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
350. Id. § 2.1-51.14 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
20001
976 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:939
training, oversight and technical assistance to localities, "serve as
a liaison to the participating state agencies," and hire a director
and staff.35' The state executive council would also be ex-
panded. 52 Another amendment requires courts, prior to final dis-
position, to refer cases where the pool of fumds for at-risk youth
and families are to be accessed to a local assessment and plan-
ning team ("FAPT") for a recommendation regarding the level of
treatment and services needed by the child and family. 53 The lo-
cal FAPT must make a report or forward a copy of the individual
family services plan to the judge within thirty days of the written
referral, and the court then shall consider the recommendation,
but is not bound by it.354 In Comprehensive Services Act Office of
Richmond v. J.M.,"' the juvenile court had ordered the CSA Of-
fice to provide a residential placement for J.M., a child in need of
supervision, and the Office appealed the order to the circuit
court. 6 That court was obligated to provide the Office a de novo
evidentiary hearing limited to the order regarding the residential
placement. 7 The Attorney General of Virginia, in an official
opinion, deferred to the state management team's interpretation
of the CSA in its manual and ruled that administrative or case
management costs are the responsibility of the locality and are
not reimbursable from the state pool of funds.358
In Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Dungee,359 a personal injury
case that generated a jury verdict of $20,000,000 in damages, the
Supreme Court of Virginia ruled, among other things, that the
question of whether a ten-year-old boy suffering from an atten-
tion deficit hyperactivity disorder was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence was properly one for the jury and it was resolved in his
favor.36° In Breeding v. Breeding,6' it was established that a child
351. Id. § 2.1-746.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
352. Id. § 2.1-746 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
353. Id. § 2.1-757(E) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
354. Id.
355. No. 1620-98-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 473 (Ct. App. Aug. 20, 1999) (unpublished
decision).
356. Id. at *4.
357. Id. at *6.
358. 1999 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 3, 5.
359. 258 Va. 235, 520 S.E.2d 164 (1999).
360. Id. at 241, 250, 520 S.E.2d at 167, 173. The court noted yet again that a defendant
has the initial burden in a case involving a child to rebut the presumption that "a child
between the ages of 7 and 14 does not have the capacity to understand the peril and dan-
gers of his acts and is, therefore, legally incapable of committing acts of negligence." Id. at
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bicyclist and her mother may assert a public nuisance claim
against a locality for negligently placing a garbage dumpster so
that it protruded into the street.362 In Johnson v. Campbell,63 the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that an infant defendant in a tort
case arising out of an automobile accident in which the plaintiffs
were injured could assert that the plaintiffs contributed to their
injuries by providing her with alcohol and marijuana, prevailing
on her to drive, and distracting her while they were traveling on
the highway.3' The Supreme Court of Virginia also reaffirmed
that no common-law negligence claim lies against a restaurant
and bartender who sold alcoholic beverages to a patron, and ruled
that such was true even where the patron was under age.365 The
Supreme Court of Virginia also determined that a teenager who
lives with her mother and the mother's male companion is not a
"foster child" within the coverage of the companion's automobile
liability insurance policy.366
An amendment to Virginia Code section 16.1-69.24 increased
the fine for contempt of court in a district court from $50 to
$250.36 In Mahoney v. Mahoney,368 the Virginia Court of Appeals
ruled that an appeal from an order holding a parent in contempt
for failure to pay child support was not an appeal from an order
establishing a support arrearage and no appeal bond was re-
quired.36 9 Although the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia
in Commonwealth ex rel. Virginia Department of Corrections v.
Brown37 related to the lack of power in a general district court to
issue a transportation order for inmates in a civil case brought by
246, 520 S.E.2d at 171. Even if that is done, the defendant must prove contributory negli-
gence itself, by showing "that the [child's] conduct did not conform to the standard of what
a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience would do under the circum-
stances." Id. at 247, 520 S.E.2d at 171. The court found the evidence that the youth suf-
fered from ADHD to be relevant to his appreciation of the danger. Id. at 248, 258, 520
S.E.2d at 172, 178.
361. 258 Va. 207, 519 S.E.2d 369 (1999).
362. Id. at 213-14, 519 S.E.2d at 372.
363. 258 Va. 453, 521 S.E.2d 764 (1999).
364. Id. at 457-58, 521 S.E.2d at 766-67.
365. Robinson v. Matt Mary Moran, Inc., 259 Va. 412, 417, 525 S.E.2d 559, 562 (2000).
366. Va. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gile, 259 Va. 164, 169, 524 S.E.2d 642, 644-45
(2000).
367. VA. CODE AN N. § 16.1-69.24 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
368. 32 Va. App. 139, 526 S.E.2d 780 (Ct. App. 2000).
369. Id. at 142, 526 S.E.2d at 781-82.
370. 259 Va. 697, 529 S.E.2d 96 (2000).
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a prisoner,3 ' the implications extend well beyond the facts of the
case itself. The holding in the case appears similarly applicable to
juvenile and domestic relations district courts, and could include
cases more significant than the faulty television set in Brown,
such as custody and visitation matters, child and spousal support
proceedings and even cases involving the termination of residual
parental rights. Although the effects of Brown in such matters
could be ameliorated somewhat through the appointment of coun-
sel or guardians ad litem for the prisoners or the participation of
the inmate, or inmates, through electronic audio or video commu-
nication, there still may be significant due process issues, espe-
cially in termination cases. After several years of effort, the Gen-
eral Assembly finally prohibited, with exemptions for farming
operations and organized parades, transportation of persons less
than sixteen years of age in the beds of pickup trucks.7 2
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled in Rivera v. Nedrich. 3
that minors could maintain an action by their next friend for
payment under a note anytime between accrual of the cause of ac-
tion and the termination of their infancy since the statute of limi-
tations was tolled. 4 Although the decision in Farrow v.
Carlton375 dates back to 1962, its ruling that an infant is not
bound by the allegations in a motion for judgment filed by its next
friend has only recently been published.7 6
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 7 the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that the New Jersey public accommodations
law could not be applied to the private, not-for-profit association
to require it to accept members or leaders who are homosexual in
light of the group's teachings disapproving of homosexuality
which are protected by the First Amendment.7 8 In Mercer v. Duke
University,"9 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972380 protected a
371. Id. at 706, 529 S.E.2d at 101.
372. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-1095, -1156.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
373. 259 Va. 1, 529 S.E.2d 310 (1999).
374. Id. at 4-5, 529 S.E.2d at 311-12.
375. 49 Va. Cir. 513 (Cir. Ct. 1962) (Spotsylvania County).
376. Id. at 518.
377. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
378. Id. at 2455.
379. 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999).
380. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
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female athlete's right to be free from gender discrimination where
the university and football coach allowed her to try out for the
team in a contact sport.38'
381. Mercer, 190 F.3d at 644.
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